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The Food and Drug Administration's purpose is to serve the public and pro-
tect the public health. There's a general standard of safety and eectiveness
for drugs and devices set by the Food and Drug Administration. In everyday
life, individuals eat food, take medications and use medical devices and these
activities are done for the most part voluntarily. Physicians, nutritionists, ad-
vertisers, and labelling may advise the public about what foods to eat, drugs
to take, and devices to use, however the choice is still ultimately left to the
consumer.
This situation diers from the situation a mentally ill child has to face in a
mental institution. If a physician or sta member believes the child needs to
be restrained or secluded, the child is restrained or secluded for the most part
against her will. Therefore, the child is the involuntary consumer of these drugs
and/or devices if they are used.
This paper will not delve into the exact FDA regulations on drugs used as
chemical restraint, which would be major tranquilizers nor on medical devices
used for mechanical restraints, such as ankle and wrist restraints. In fact, this
paper will assume that the drugs and devices used for restraint and seclusion
have passed the safety and eectiveness standards. Rather this paper will discuss
a broad overview of the use of seclusion and restraint of children in mental
institutions and its possible value and necessity to children and society. This
paper will include the types of restraints used, the status of children in our
society, justications for seclusion and restraint, nonsupport of seclusion and
restraint, a brief history of seclusion and restraint, the therapeutic value of
seclusion, the variation in uses of seclusion
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and restraint, Youngberg v. Romeo the liability for the abuse of seclusion
and restraint, and the guidelines as to when to seclude or restrain a child.
Types of Restraint and Seclusion
Seclusion and restraint of children are implemented in psychiatric in-patient
units all over the country. The types of restraint and seclusion used to restrain a
mentally ill child are mechanical restraint, chemical restraint, physical restraint
and seclusion. Mechanical restraint is the use of a physical device to restrict
patient movement or normal function of a portion of his/her body. Chemical re-
straint is the administration of medication, most likely a major tranquilizer in or-
der to restrain or restrict the movement of a patient. Most of the time, this type
of restraint is preceded by physical restraint, at least by physical holding.' Phys-
ical restraint is the use of bodily physical force to limit a patient's movement,
such as physically holding a child, for more than a ve minute interval. Seclu-
sion is the placement of a patient in a room alone where a door or sta member
might block the exit. Children's Right to Be Free v. State's Right to Intervene
All children need basic care and protection to make it through childhood.
Children and adolescents struggle to survive in the world while simultaneously
growing and absorbing life with immature resources. Moreover, childhood is
associated with helplessness and vulnerability. These are some of the reasons
why children are not given the rights nor responsibilities as adults in our soci-
ety. Rather, extensive limits are placed on their personal freedom. In fact, all
children are intrinsically commitable
1Donald S. Gair, Tuvenile Psychiatry and the Law (Richard Rosner & Harold
Schwartz eds.
1989) p. 360.
2
321d at 354.
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on the basis of inability to cope safely, even with no mental illness.
2 Children are dependent minors under obligatory supervision by
parents or other adults. When children are committed to a mental institu-
tion this status does not change. Rather their custody is shifted from one set of
adults to another. During hospitalization children must be under the immediate
supervision of responsible adults at all times. These adults have constant re-
sponsibility over these children and have the authority to make critical decisions
during emergency situations as well as to engage in the treatment program for
the child. The nursing sta are the caretakers of the children the great majority
of the time.
Ethically, restraint or seclusion may seem to run counter with the proper
treatment of children. However, there are times when children lack inner con-
trol and can present harm to themselves and physical danger to others. They
may display destructiveness to property; chaotic, disruptive behavior; and in-
ability to cope safely. Limitations are placed on children because of society's
recognition of the necessity to protect children because of their inherent limi-
tations in judgment and self-control. When children cannot control their own
behavior, responsible adults must do it for them until they are able to do it for
themselves.3
Restraint procedures are initiated when a patient's self-control fails, leading
to injury or threat of injury to self or others. When restraint is done to a
child patient it is an extension of the already existing formal system of external
controls that society provides in recognition of the dangers implicit in children's
intrinsic limitations in judgment and self-control.4 However,
3
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seclusion and restraint should be used only when they are deemed the
only measures adequate and available to meet the needs of the situation. ~
Justication for Seclusion and Restraint
One of the strongest justications for restraint is for the protection of the
person, of others, or of both. Lack of alternatives and benecial therapeutic
eects of restraint and seclusion are some strong justications for their use. Sev-
eral authors have stated that there are psychiatric emergency situations where
medication and verbal therapies are insucient to control volatile situations. 6
It's been stated that the clinical reality is that few patients are ever totally
out of control. Also, few patients ever want to be in the state of loss of control.
External control, however much it is fought against, is also welcome.7 This can
be shown when patients ask worriedly if they can be managed when they are
aware that there is a shortage of sta on a certain shift. It has also been reported
that when structural damage to seclusion room doors at a children's mental hos-
pital made it easy for children to break out of seclusion the incidence of episodes
calling for restraint escalated dramatically. When the doors were repaired, the
incidence fell precipitously.8 Non-support for Seclusion and Restraint
In the area of restraint and seclusion, there are many who fear its abuse and
psychological, physical and emotional consequences. Seclusion and
5Gair, Guidelines for children and adolescents, in Tardi K (ed): The Psychiatric Uses of Seclusion and Restraint.
Washington DC, American Psychiatric Press, 1984, p. 84. 6Telintelo, S.,
Kuhlman, T.L., & Winget, C. (1983). A study of the use of restraint in a
psychiatric emergency room. Hospital and Community Psychiatry 34, 164-165.
'Gair, ~u~ra note 1, at 356.
8Gair, ~ note 5, at 69-85.
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restraint may involve physical and psychological risks.9 It may also produce
negative reactions in patients and sta. 10 Qthers report that seclusion or
restraint may be used as punishment to patients.11 Another concern is that
seclusion or restraint may be used more frequently due to stang shortages.
12 Lastly, seclusion or restraint may be an infringement of civil rights.13
Some believe that we cannot restrain someone and help him at the same
time. Senator Backman, in his press release vowed to abolish all restraint of
children, stated: 1 do not believe that a psychiatrist or psychologist or social
worker or priest or rabbi can say to a child, 'I want to help you,' and then lock
the child up.
Also it has been argued that many decisions to restrain are not medical
decisions ar all. For example, what degree or imminence of danger justies re-
straints? And do the social consequences of mental regression justify restraints?
These questions may deal with social and moral values such as the importance
of freedom and the rights of the individual against the group.
14
These concerns address the uncertainty in the consequences and use of re-
straint and seclusion. However, these issues have been addressed to a certain
degree, and due to the fact that the use of restraint and seclusion for children
continues to be used throughout the country, perhaps the benets outweigh the
costs.
9Nelson, S.H., McKinney, A., Ludwig, K., & Davis, R. (1983). An unusual
death of a patient in seclusion. Hospital and Community Psychiatry 34, 259.
10Binder, R.L., & McCoy, S.M. (1983). A study of patients' attitudes toward
placement in seclusion. Hospital and Community Psychiatr'~ 34, 1052-1054.
11Binder, R.L. (1979). The use of seclusion on a inpatient crisis intervention
unit. kI~pitaLand Community Psychiatry 30,266-269.
12Hay, D., & Cromwell, R. (1980). Reducing the use of full-leather restraints on
an acute adult inpatient ward. Hospital and Community Psychiatry 31, 198-
200.
13Old~~, J., Russako, L.M., & Prusnofsky L. (1983). Seclusion: Patterns
and Millieu. IQurnal of Nervous and Mental Disease 171, 645-650; Youngberg
v. Romeo (1982), 102 S.Ct. 2452. 14Saks, Elyn R. (1986). Mechanical Re-
straints. Yale Law Tournal 95, 1850.
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For example, it was suggested that seclusion and restraint may be used for
sta convenience regardless of patient need and that with less sta and more
patients, seclusion and restraint would be used more frequently. However, a
study of New York State Psychiatric Centers found little evidence of this. Most
of the orders were written during the day shift and on weekdays when sta
was most plentiful. There was a lack of relationship between patient/sta ratio
and precipitating cause (violent/non-violent), receiving PRN medications, and
spending less time than was ordered. This study undermined the hypothesis
that seclusion and restraint is used for sta convenience regardless of patient
need.15
History of Seclusion and Restraint
Throughout history, the practice of restraint and seclusion have been associ-
ated with punishment, custodial care, institutional abuse and neglect. Restraint
is not a scientic discovery. Its origins go back to primitive societies as a nat-
ural response to the danger presented to the public by a deranged member of
society.16 These individuals were banished, tied down, or caged. The decreases
in these practices have been associated with reform, moral progress, and human-
itarianism. 17 It may have started with Pinel's partial removal of chains from
patients in a Parisian Hospital in the 1790s. 18 And it may have progressed to
the 1950s Boston hospital study of negative factors sustaining the practice of
seclusion.19
15Way, Bruce B. (1986). The Use of Restraint and Seclusion in New York
State Psychiatric
Centers, International Tournal of Law and Psychiatry 8, 383-393.
16Westermeyer, J., Kroll, J. (1978). Violence and mental illness in a peasant
society:
Characteristics of violent behaviors and folk use of restraints. British loumal of Psychiatry
133, 529-54 1.
G17 Gair, supra note 1, at 443.
18Pinel, A. (1962). A treatise on insanity (D.D. Davis, Trans.). New York:
New York Academy
of Medicine, Hafner Publishing. (Reprinted in facsimile from original work pub-
lished in 1806).
19Greenblatt, M., York, R.H., & Brown, E.L. (1955). From custodial to therapeutic patient care
im~na1bQ~ia1~. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
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It is easy to see the natural abhorrence to this type of treatment. However,
today, the restraint and seclusion of individuals is still being used. Although it
may be quite oensive to individuals in our society, the professionals for the most
part have recognized the need for restraint. Therapeutic Value of Seclusion
There is evidence of the therapeutic value of seclusion procedures when prop-
erly applied. Without an understanding of the purpose and therapeutic value
for seclusion and restraint, it is more likely to be implemented poorly, to the
detriment of the patients and the morale of the sta who care for them. 20
It has been recognized by physicians that the regular imposition of predictable
restraints following episodes of undesirable loss of control has an observable ef-
fect on the patient's increasing self-control.21 Often patients will ask for periods
in a seclusion room rather than having to go out of control. In some places
such as Washington D.C., Georgia and in Massachusetts by judicial review on
a case-by-case basis, seclusion and restraint may be used as part of a specic
treatment program. However, the law generally prohibits the use of restraint as
a treatment procedure.
It has been found that seclusion can be used eectively for some children
as an essential step in the process of learning control through the experience
of control. The experience can introduce positive coping skills as leaving the
scene for awhile, seeking solace in quiet places, using privacy to think about a
situation, waiting before reacting when frustrated, taking the consequences of a
minor infraction without creating a major problem.22
20 Cotton, Nancy S. (1989). The Developmental-Clinical Rationale for the
use of Seclusion in the Psychiatric Treatment of Children. American Tourrial of Orthopsychiatry
59(3), 442. 21Gair, D.S., Bullard, D.M., Corwin J.H., (1965): Residential treat-
ment Seclusion of children as a therapeutic ward practice. American Tournal of Orthopsychiatry
35, 251-252. 22Gair, supia note 1, at 448.
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Restraint and seclusion is used frequently by adults to teach their children
and not to retaliate. For example, a child being sent to her room is a frequent
form of discipline used in the homes of many parents. The argument can be
made that the use of seclusion in a hospital ward is used in the same way and
can be used eectively as part of the discipline process whenever the child is
unable to do work on the process herself. In addition, the restraint should be
explained to the child that it is only for protection and not punishment and
that the restraints will be removed once it is safe.
In order for seclusion to be therapeutic it must provide physical, but never
psychological, separation from people and situations.23 If the sta are angry,
the handling is rough, or the room physically unattractive, seclusion can rep-
resent another abandonment for the child. Conversely, if the sta are rm yet
caring, if the room is comfortable and safe, then the child may be better able
to experience the separation as a protective, reasonable, and caring response
to impulsive behavior or inability to cope with the environment. 24 A good
example of this is the seclusion room at New England Memorial Hospital which
was built to resemble a child's den with a low bench, carpeting, a pleasant out-
door view through an unbreakable plexiglass, and a window into the director's
oce. 25 This kind of environment was designed to make the negative potential
of seclusion as minimal as possible by keeping the child in contact with people
and making the room as comfortable as possible. Unfortunately, not every hos-
pital has the amenities and therapeutic milieu as the New England Memorial
Hospital.
at 448-449.
at 449.
25Cotton, N. & Geraty, R.G. (1984). Therapeutic space design: Planning
an inpatient children's unit. American Tournal of Orthopsychiatry 54, 624-636.
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However, there are many factors involved in making the seclusion process as
therapeutic as possible. The policies must be dened, conducted in a consistent
manner; explained to the child; administered by well-trained professional and
humanitarian sta; supervised by a a trained sta; and the space must be safe,
attractive, and soothing. 26
Three empirical studies conducted on the use of seclusion or quiet-room (door
unlocked) use on school-age units all demonstrate that seclusion and quiet rooms
are integral to the treatment practices of the inpatient psychiatry units.27 Data
from these papers suggest that the use of seclusion for children is dierent than
that of adults, being more frequent and for briefer periods in the case of chil-
dren. The study also found that children who are likely candidates for seclusion
have certain characteristics. Biologically, they often have pathological fam-
ily histories, attentional and learning problems, and neurological impairments.
Psychologically, they have poor self-esteem, defective object-relations, poor im-
pulse control, maladaptive coping strategies, and immature defenses. Socially,
they often live in poverty with family histories of loss, violence, neglect, and
abuse. Obviously, if the child and family is going through a maladaptive cycle
intervention is necessary. 28
Comparing chemical. mechanical, physical restraint and seclusion
There is controversy as to the hierarchy of the relative restrictiveness between
chemical and physical restraint and seclusion. A survey of Arizona
26Cotton, sunra note 20, at 449.
27Garrison, W.T. (1984). Aggressive behavior, seclusion and physical restraint
in an inpatient child population. Tournal of the American Academy of Child Psychiatry
23, 448-452; Joshhi, P.T., Capozzoli, J.A., & Coyle, J.T. (1988). Use of the quiet
room on a children's inpatient unit. American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry
27, 642-644; Millstein, K.H. (1986). A study of factors predictive of the need for seclusion in latency-age hospitalized children with
ps~cbii~rbl~zm. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Boston College.
LSCotton, supra note 20, at 444.
9
1029 Gair, supta note 1, at 389.
30liat 75.
31Way, supra..note 15
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state mental health program directors shows that seclusion is to be used after
all else except restraints fail, and this includes chemical restraint. This diers
from the New Hampshire guidelines which seem to indicate that, seclusion is
the least restrictive, followed by physical restraints, and then chemical ones.
There is much debate as to what types of restraint are superior to others.
In fact, authorities on the subject vary greatly on their ranking of restraints
and seclusion. There may be dierences between seclusion and restraint in
cost, probability of serious sta injury, requirements of sta time to monitor
and implement, and the impact on sta and patient attitudes. 29 The merits
of one procedure may vary depending on variables such as patient and sta
composition, type of ward, and ward atmosphere.
It has been argued that it is unwise to have a hospital use a variety of dierent
procedures to handle seclusion and restraint because it would be confusing for
the sta.30 A 1984 study was done on the use of seclusion and restraint of all
New York state-operated psychiatric hospitals. It was found that most hospitals
in the study used almost exclusively only one technique{seclusion or restraint{to
deal with similar psychiatric emergencies.31
Some argue that the type of restraint or seclusion used should be determined
by what is in the best interest of the child. Characteristics of the child (e.g.,
psychiatric diagnosis, strengths, family history) should determine what should
occur at any point in treatment. And that seclusion or restraint should be
used on the basis of the developmental and clinical status of the child, not on
the general protocols or sta preferences. For example, it may be better to
physically hold rather than seclude a young child who is still gaining controls
within attachments to emotionally important adults. Adolescents
10
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may benet more from mechanical restraints within which they can regain
control independently of adults from whom, they may need to separate. Also,
psychopharmacological interventions may be more problematic for children in
families with a history of drug or alcohol abuse because this may be associated
with trauma in a child's experience. 32
Some argue a patient should have a choice among appropriate control mea-
sures, even if the patients are of questionable competence, because of the lack of
consensus in the medical community of any particular ranking of these measures.
For example, it has been shown that adult patients overwhelmingly prefer seclu-
sion to restraints.33 A patient in a seclusion room can move around if he wants to
whereas a patient in restraints can do nothing. Also a patient in restraints suers
the physical pain of forced immobility. Restraints can also violates one's dignity
more than seclusion. Nothing in someone's day-to-day routine prepares one for
being strapped down, while being alone in a room|even a locked room|is a
part of most individuals' life experiences.34 If restraints fulll the same purpose
as seclusion, and seclusion is preferred by patients, perhaps restraints should be
conned to when there is an imminent danger of harm to self. Seclusion may
also be substituted when there is danger of harm to othes, but not to self.
Restraint requires direct close physical contact between sta and child there-
fore the relationship between sta and children is of great importance. The ef-
fects of such procedures on mental health professionals must also be considered.
There can be much emotional tension when dealing with restraint. There is the
eye for an eye phenomenon, where many times the
32Cotton, supra note 20, at 447.
33Soliday, (1985). A Comparison of Patient and Sta Attitudes toward Seclu-
sion, 173 J~u.raal of Nervous & Mental Disease. 173, 284 (74% of patients
surveyed think restraints are more unpleasant than seclusion).
34Saks, supra note 14, 1852.
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sta will want to retaliate if hit, scratched, bit, kicked or spit at. This
retaliatory tendency must be neutralized in order for workers to provide humane
care. Also, understandably, interactions can have a long-lasting eect on the
children and family members.35 Obviously, further research needs to be done in
this area.
Physical Restraint
The use of holding may provide body contact between a young patient and
one or more sta members. This type of restraint may seem more humane than
the other types of restraint, however, there are limits to this type of restraint.
For example, when a patient is in a violent state, physical restraining by others
may be inammatory. 36 Conversely, when a patient is placed in a seclusion
room, it is shown that a calming process begins. This is attributed to the huge
reduction in stimulation that comes from being secluded.37 In addition, physical
holding for every patient would require an exorbitant and impractical number
of sta. Children even seven to eight years old may require as many as ve
adults for safe physical management. Chemical Restraint
Chemical restraint is given by a physician order who must be adequately
knowledgeable about the circumstances. However, in many jurisdictions, in the
case of an emergency, chemical restraint may be used in the absence of specic
permission, but if there is any doubt, a sta member may get authorization
from a judge. In states such as Massachusetts there are judges on 24-hour call
for such emergency decisions.
35Gair, supra note 1, at 361.
36j~
37Gutheil T. (1978). Observations on the theoretical bases for seclusion of the
psychiatric
inpatient. American Toumal of Psychiatry 135, 325-328.
12
1338 Gair, supra, note 1, at 361.
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There is always a risk from any major tranquilizer. However, self-mutilating
behavior and persistent violent physical struggling against mechanical restraints
with the risk of exhaustion may require the need for chemical restraint. 38
Youngberg v. Romeo
In a 1982 U.S. Supreme Court case, Youngberg v. Romeo 102 Supreme Ct.
2452 (1982), the Court viewed restraint and seclusion as best regulated by in-
ternal professional norms and therefore deferred to professional judgment and
clinical considerations. Youngberg v. Romeo involved the rights of an invol-
untary institutionalized developmentally disabled person to be free from bodily
restraint. The Supreme Court held that committed patients are constitutionally
entitled to personal security and to freedom from bodily restraint, however, the
court qualied those rights substantially. The court also held that a patient is
entitled to training in order to avoid unconstitutional infringement of his rights
to bodily safety and freedom from physical restraints. The Court in B~m~ rec-
ognized that there are occasions in which it is necessary for the State to restrain
the movement of residents
to protect them as well as others from violence. Similar restraints may also
be appropriate in a training program. And an institution cannot protect its
residents from all danger of violence if it is to permit them to have any freedom
of movement. (at 2460).
Although the Supreme Court found patients to possess an interest in safety,
an interest in freedom from bodily restraint, and to a lesser extent, an interest
in habilitation, the Court found these interests to not be absolute and that the
interests in bodily safety and bodily freedom are to some degree in
13
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conict (at 2460). The constitutional standard used by the Court requires
that the courts make certain professional judgment in fact was exercised. (at
2461). However, if a lawsuit alleging constitutional deprivation is led following
the seclusion or restraint of a patient, the decision, if made by a professional,
is presumptively valid and liability may be imposed only when the decision
by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional
judgment, practice or standard as to demonstrate that the person responsible
actually did not base the decision on such a judgment. (at 2462).
The court also dened professional broadly, encompassing a person com-
petent, whether by education, training, or experience to make the particular
decision at issue (at 2462). The Court acknowledged that day-today decisions
regarding care |- including decisions that must be made without delay { neces-
sarily will be made in many instances by employees without formal training but
who are subject to the supervision of qualied persons (at 2462). The Court also
noted that individual professionals would not be liable if professional standards
were unable to be satised because of budgetary constraints. RQm~ seems
greatly concerned with institutional administration.
The Court stated that it is not appropriate for the courts to specify which
of several professionally acceptable choices should have been made (at 2461).
Before EQm~, several courts found constitutional reasons to require specic
procedures attending seclusion or restraint, among them: that patients be per-
sonally examined by a qualied mental health professional prior to restraint and
by a psychiatrist within two hours of restraint; that patients be checked every
15 minutes and that reevaluation occur within 12
14
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hours.39 After the I~m~ decision these procedures seem too specic to be
constitutionally required, however Paul Appelbaum has stated that many of
them are merely elaborations of good clinical practices that should be followed
everywhere.
Therefore, state statutes, administrative regulations, and institutional poli-
cies may establish strict standards regarding the use of seclusion and restraint
although the promulgation of stuch standards is not constitutionally required.
Some physicians desire standards not only because this would probably help
codify good clinical practice, but if followed, would probably protect profession-
als from legal liability.40
The Supreme Court in Youngberg v. Romeo granted the professional much
leeway in making a decision on restraining or secluding a patient. Perhaps the
Court realized that if it didn't allow presumptively valid professional judgment,
every clinical decision would be subject to adversarial debate and would paralyze
hospital management. There is a constant tension among physicians and the
legal system. Many physicians feel that restrictions are placed on them by those
who are not in the best position to know and this hinders their performance
as physicians and can actually do more harm than good. For example, in 1984
a bill banning seclusion (but not mechanical restraints) for all children under
eighteen in licensed psychiatric hospitals went into eect in Massachusetts.41
This caused great diculties in facilities with children who frequently needed to
be secluded. Many of these children had to be held or mechanically restrained
instead of being placed in a seclusion room and they protested the change. 42
Afer professional groups
391d. at 289.
~Wexler, David B. (1982). Seclusion and Restraint: Lessons from Law,
Psychiatry, and Psychology. International lournal of Law and Psychiatry 5,287.
41Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 464, Acts 1984.
42Gair supia note 1.
15
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lobbied intensely for rescinding the change, new legislation permitted seclu-
sion for children under eighteen years after assuring that proper procedures and
monitoring are in place.
However, sometimes state legislation yields a positive result as shown by an
attempt in 1985 to reduce the rates of restraint in children in Massachusetts. In
1985, Massachusetts implemented a restrictive state law to regulate the psychi-
atric use of restraint. Indeed, the result was as hypothesized as the total number
of hours in restraint was reduced signicantly on a child and adolescent unit.
The number of patients and episodes of chemical restraint on the unit were not
signicantly aected. The use of chemical restraints were not aected by the
law because sta had already used chemical restraints sparingly. Also, the Mas-
sachusetts case Rogers et al v. Commissioner of the Department of Mental Health et al.
390 Mass. 489 (1983), which attempted to regulate the forced use of medication
inuenced the sta. The study concluded that there are a variety of factors
which may inuence the reduction of restraint in dierent facilities. Factors
such as the number of children with problems in impulse control, crowding,
stang patterns, and the philosophy of the sta.
Liability for abuse of seclusion and restraint
The superintendent or director of any hospital has ultimate civil and profes-
sional responsibility for the safety, well-being, and relevant rights of all patients
under his or her care. Therefore, all the events that occur in a psychiatric hos-
pital for children are the legal responsibility of the superintendent or director.
Although all sta members have legal responsibility for their own actions, it is
only partial compared to that of the director. However, it has been recognized
that the great majority of the time
16
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seclusion or restraint is implemented when a physician is not immediately
present. In most psychiatric wards, the nursing sta are the only ones constantly
present with the children. Therefore they need to be able to recognize the need
for seclusion. However, after seclusion has occurred, the physician should take
an active role in monitoring the child. Therefore, a psychiatrist in charge of a
ward should regularly review and discuss with the sta situations and judgments
leading to seclusion, techniques used, assessment of children's readiness to leave
seclusion, and the apparent overall eects. ~
There should be liability for unreasonably restraining patients. It should
not be set so high as to risk jury nullication, nor so low as to become merely
a cost of doing business. 'i Also, doctors should not be held liable for injuries
resulting from a failure to restrain patients, unless a person of the ~~most com-
mon understanding would have foreseen serious injuries of the kind described
in the statute. ~ This would at least recognize the doctor's limits in predicting
violence.
When Should a Child be Secluded or Restrained?
There have been attempts to establish guidelines to reduce the negative
aspects of seclusion/restraint by determining when seclusion/restraint should
be used.46 One of the guidelines has been oered by the American Psychiatric
Association. '~~' Two authorities on seclusion and restraint, Gutheil and Tardi,
developed the following ve clinical indications for
43Gair, supra note 1, at 78.
~Saks, supra note 14, at 1855. 451d.
~McCoy, S. M., & Garritson 5. (1983). Seclusion: The process of intervening.
J~urnaL~f Psychosocial Nursing and Mental Health Services 21, 9-15.
47American Psychiatric Association (1984). Seclusion and Restraint: The Psy-
chiatric Uses. Report of the American Psychiatric Association Task Force on the
Psychiatric Uses of Restraint and Seclusion, Washington: American Psychiatric
Association.
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restraints of all patients in the American Psychiatric Association Task Force
on Seclusion and Restraint. These indications arise with hospitalized children:
(a) to prevent imminent harm to the patient or other persons when other means
of control are not eective or appropriate; (b) to prevent serious disruption of
the treatment program or signicant damage to the physical environment; (c)
to assist in treatment as part of ongoing behavior therapy; (d) to decrease the
stimulation a patient receives (pertaining solely to seclusion); and (e) to comply
with a patient's request.48 Although these are very well authorized indications
for the restraint or seclusion of a patient, in some states, such as Massachusetts,
the only basis for restraint is basically the presence of violent behavior to self
or others or its imminent threat.49 The prevention of disruption of program or
damage to environment is not a permissible reason for restraint in many states.
However, if this leads to violent behavior the child would need to be restrained.
50
Justication for restraint based on the prevention of imminent harm depends
on the likelihood of further violence. 51 An obvious example is when a patient is
engaged in actual violent conduct or makes a serious threat or attempt to engage
in violent behavior. A more dicult case is when there is no specic violent
act, threat, or attempt on the part of the patient, but rather, for example, a
signicant change in behavior. Most likely, a clinician will be supported by the
EQm~.Q case if action is taken, if clinical judgment is used and especially if it
is known that a particular behavior is a precursor to violence or to other serious
uncontrollable behavior.52 Solo, Gutheil, and
~Gutheil TG, Tardi K: Indications and contraindications for seclusion and
restraint, in Tardi K (ed): The Psychiatric Uses of Seclusio and Restraint. Wash-
ington DC, American Psychiatric Press, 1984, pp 11-17.
'~9Gair, supra note 1, at 356.
501d at 357.
at 356.
52~ at 288.
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Wexler (1985) state: there is overwhelming empirical support for using seclu-
sion and restraint to limit the progressive disorganization of behavior prior to
actual violence (p. 657).~3 It has been stated that it is the obligation of the sta
to intercede early,.., and that it is not therapeutic for a patient to be required
to assault another person in order to obtain the containment he may need. 54
The Dierent Types of Restraint statutes.
Restraint statutes may be divided into seven categories. One type of statute
requires that the use of restraints be recorded. Second are statutes that proscribe
unnecessary or excessive restraints. Third are statutes that require restraints to
be prescribed by a designated authority, usually a physician. Fourth are statutes
that allow restraints only if required by the medical needs of the patient. Fifth
are statutes that allow restraints for either safety in an emergency or on a
professional's written order explaining the rationale for the restraint. Sixth
are statutes that allow restraints for either the safety or the treatment of the
patient. And seventh are the statutes that require dangerousness to self or
others. ~ Lacking in most state statutes are the amount of restraint exercised
which is required to achieve the desired result and the allowance of patient
choice.56
53Solo, Ph.H., Gutheil, T.G., & Wexler, D.B. (1985). Seclusion and re-
straint in 1985: A review and update. Hospital and Community Psychiatry 36,
652-657.
54Oldham, J., Russako, L.M., & Prusnofsky L. (1983). Seclusion: Patterns
and milieu. Jimmal of Nervous and Mental Disease 171, 645-650.
55Saks, supra note 14, at 1841.
56jj 1842.
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CQnd~sion
It is the hope that the use of seclusion and restraint would be rendered
obsolete by such advances in the eld of psychiatry such as the use of psy-
chopharmacology and the therapeutic milieu.57 However, this goal has not been
realized as studies combining data on seclusion and restraint reveal an incidence
of use varying from 2% to 66%.~ In order to reach the goal of rendering obsolete
the use of seclusion and restraint, more research needs to be done in understand-
ing mental illness. Currently, medications can alleviate some of the symptoms
of mental illness, but they cannot cure the illness. And to safely and eectively
utilize seclusion and restraint, more research should be done on seclusion and
restraint practices across a wide range of psychiatric treatment settings.
Guidelines should be developed in every psychiatric setting dealing with
when to act, whether to administer seclusion or restraint, and the duration of
seclusion and restraint. Guidelines are necessary because not only can it give
the clinician some general guidance, but abuses can occur when someone is given
unfettered discretion. In addition, physicians may not take the time and eort
to keep up-to-date on new techniques and information.
Those of us who are uninvolved in the day-to-day life in a mental institution
are unlikely to understand the dynamics of a mental institution as well as as
the reality of the need for restraints. Clinicians many times are in a catch-22
situation. On the one hand a patient has a right to be free from
57Solo, P.H. (1984). Historical notes on seclusion and restraint. In K.
Tardi (Ed.), Ib~
Psychiatric Uses of Seclusion and Restraint (pp. 1-9). Washington, D.C.: Amer-
ican Psychiatric
Press.
585~,lo P.H., Gutheil, T.G., & Wexler, D.B. (1985). Seclusion and restraint in
19485: A review
and update. Hospital and Community Psychiatry 36,652-657.
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unnecessary seclusion and restraint. On the other hand, patients in the ward
have a right to be protected against assaultive behavior.
It is the goal of medicine to give care and treatment without the iniction of
pain, but pain unfortunately accompanies some treatments. Hippocrates stated
primum, non nocere, (rst, do no harm), but pain is not synonymous with harm.
Some may argue that seclusion and restraint is like that of a cast to a broken
bone. A cast is not what one would consider an aversive treatment of a fracture,
yet it is a type of restraint and it aids in growth. Seclusion and restraint is not
welcomed by a child even though there may be evidence that he is reassured by
it. And this may feel like punishment for the child. But properly brought up
children will feel victimized as necessary limits are placed on them. However,
the limits and restrictions must not be excessive. Basically, all children need
basic care and protection. And as Donald Gair stated, Mentally ill and disabled
children surely need even more.
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